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Bennett: Research & Debate

RESEARCH & DEBATE

PARSHALL’S “WHOPPERS” EXAMINED FACT-CHECKING THE VARIOUS
CLAIMS AND CONCLUSIONS OF JONATHAN PARSHALL

Martin Bennett

This was written in response to an article by Jon Parshall that appeared in the
Spring 2010 Naval War College Review.1 When I first came across Parshall’s article
I was interested and even intrigued, but the more I read, the more apparent it
became that his work was not sound.
One element, I believe, that may have colored what otherwise might have been
an objective analysis was Parshall’s clearly stated goal to “bury Fuchida.” Generally, a biased, set conclusion is not a good starting point for a historical analysis.
Good research begins with questions and ends with conclusions, when facts
permit. Parshall attempts to make the facts fit his conclusions, and when he cannot, he uses conjecture and assumptions to try to bridge the gap. Throughout his
article, Parshall employs a wide variety of euphemisms accusing Fuchida of “lies.”
One would expect a less snarky, cynical analysis from a historian.
On my first reading I knew that Parshall had made some mistakes, but I never
realized just how many until I actually started checkAfter serving eight years as vice president of a noning. There is no doubt that Jon Parshall is a smart and
profit company and cofounding a manufacturing
company (which won the 2003 award for Small Busiknowledgeable historian who has done some great
ness Administration Entrepreneur of the Year), Marwork. Yet instead of overturning the record on Fuchida,
tin Bennett now devotes his time to historical research
he has instead turned a light onto his own methods and
and scriptwriting. His second script is for a feature
film about the lives of Mitsuo Fuchida, Jacob “Jake”
thereby called into question the trustworthiness of the
DeShazer, and the Covell family, entitled Wounded
entire body of research underpinning his coauthored
Tiger: The True Story of the Pilot Who Led the
book, Shattered Sword.
Attack on Pearl Harbor. While developing the film
project, Bennett converted the script into a historical
Since most of the arguments come down to the
novel, to be published under the same title in 2013.
credibility of four individuals, here is a look at who
they are.
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Jon Parshall’s biographical note for his article in the Review describes him as
the “coauthor of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway and
the owner of a website on the Imperial Japanese Navy, www.combinedfleet.com.
Mr. Parshall has been published in such periodicals as the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, World War II, and this journal, and he has made frequent television
and guest lecture appearances on the topic of the Imperial Navy in World War II.
He is also an adjunct lecturer for the Naval War College. Mr. Parshall is currently
in the software industry.”
Gordon W. Prange received his PhD in history in 1937 from the University of
Iowa and began his teaching career the same year as a professor of history at the
University of Maryland. In 1942 he was granted a leave of absence to embark on
a wartime career as an officer in the U.S. Navy. Sent to Japan in 1945 as a member
of the American Occupation Forces, Prange completed his naval service soon
thereafter, continuing in Japan as a civilian from 1946 to 1951, as the chief of
General Douglas MacArthur’s hundred-person historical staff. Shortly after the
war, he began a series of interviews with Mitsuo Fuchida that extended for hundreds of hours over a period of years. He was the author of six books, some prepared for publication after his death in 1980 by Katherine V. Dillon and Donald
Goldstein. Among the most prominent is At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of
Pearl Harbor, the culmination of thirty-seven years of research. He was arguably
the most knowledgeable person on Pearl Harbor.
Donald Goldstein is professor emeritus at the Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. In addition to his contributions
to Prange’s At Dawn We Slept, Miracle at Midway, and God’s Samurai, he also
collaborated with historian J. Michael Wenger on several books, including The
Way It Was: Pearl Harbor—the Original Photographs (1995); Rain of Ruin: A Photographic History of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1995); and The Pearl Harbor Papers:
Inside the Japanese Plans (1993). He is today the most prominent living historian
on Pearl Harbor and Mitsuo Fuchida.
Mitsuo Fuchida was the senior flight commander of the First Air Fleet, First
Carrier Division. He led the attack on Pearl Harbor, ending the war as a captain.
After the war, Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya coauthored Midway: The Battle
That Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy’s Story.2 Regarding the overall credibility
of their book, the historian Thomas B. Buell explains in the introduction to its
1992 edition:
[Midway] is a story written by two Japanese naval officers who were in a position to
know about the details of that battle, but much of what they have to say is personal
opinion, which may not necessarily have been shared by colleagues. Although the
book does not have a bibliography, the editors’ preface states that they researched
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and authenticated the data to the extent possible using both Japanese and American
records. As one of the editors was Roger Pineau, the premier American expert on the
Japanese navy in the war, there is good reason to believe that the data as to events is
accurate. I am not aware of any challenges to its assertions since this book was first
published in 1955.3

Fuchida also wrote his memoirs, which were published posthumously in Japanese, later in English under the title For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo
Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor.4
So let’s break it down.

Naval History & Heritage Command (NHHC) Photo no. NH 50930

PARSHALL’S FIRST SET OF ASSERTIONS IS
THREEFOLD
Parshall states that Fuchida would never have mentally earmarked fuel tank farms for destruction,
that Fuchida never entered into a heated argument
on the bridge of Akagi demanding a third-wave attack, and that a “mere air group commander” like
Fuchida would never have been privy to such information regarding the details of a possible land invasion. Let’s look at each of Parshall’s charges.

Fuchida Never Made a Mental Earmark to Target the Tank Farms
Parshall believes he knows what was in Fuchida’s mind as he circled Pearl Harbor and looked down at massive fuel storage tanks. He finds it unbelievable that
Fuchida thought they would make opportune targets. Parshall believes that
Fuchida added this statement only in 1963 to make himself appear more clever.
What would be truly remarkable is if the Imperial Japanese Navy’s top pilot
had not had such thoughts. Of course, Fuchida knew the list of target priorities,
carefully outlined during the meetings in Yokosuka and on board Akagi, but he
had also spent the morning circling Pearl Harbor with binoculars in one hand,
a map in the other, and a notepad strapped to his leg, assessing the scene. The
Japanese had been spurred to war in part by the precious commodity of oil, and
they knew its strategic value to the Americans. Parshall’s argument is that no independent confirmation exists of Fuchida’s mental notes. This is an absurd claim.
Parshall also believes that no one thought of bombing the tank farms until the
Americans later pointed them out, and he refers to an interrogation in 1945 by
the Americans who asked Fuchida why there had not been a follow-up attack on
Pearl Harbor. Fuchida answered but made no comment about possible targets
in the event of such an attack (which was not germane to the question). This is
Parshall’s smoking gun.
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There are two problems with this argument. First, postwar military inquiries
are not free-flowing conversations but more like legal depositions—question
and answer. Also, Fuchida did in fact mention the tank farms to Gordon Prange
on 4 March 1948.5 Was Fuchida making himself out to be some kind of genius
(supposedly in retrospect) by saying he thought about bombing the fuel tanks?
Not at all—a Japanese captain on another fleet carrier had exactly the same idea:
On board the carrier Soryu, Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi reported that his ship and the
carrier Hiryu and their aircraft were ready to launch the third wave attack. Capt.
Jisaku Okada of the carrier Kaga, the second carrier accompanying the Akagi, recommended that the fuel tanks and dock facilities be included in the list of targets, even
if the attack sorties were flown the next day. The remaining two carriers—Shokaku
and Zuikaku—reported that they were ready to return for another attack on Pearl
Harbor.6

Also, from interviews with Fuchida found in God’s Samurai and in his Memoirs, it is clear that he vigorously disagreed with the recommendation of Kusaka
(rear admiral and chief of staff of the First Air Fleet during the attacks, whom
Fuchida did not care for as an officer) to retreat after the successful attack on
Pearl Harbor. He refers to Kusaka’s philosophy as “lions retreat once they have
accomplished their attack.” Yet at the same time he quotes Kusaka as saying, “We
have now accomplished the purpose of our operation by attacking Pearl Harbor
and annihilating the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Any further attempt to attack oil tanks or
repair facilities at the naval shipyard is nothing but the hindsight of fools.”7 If
Fuchida was supposedly trying to make himself appear clever, in retrospect,
would it be logical for him to want Kusaka to appear equally clever?
There Was No Heated Argument on the Bridge of Akagi Following the Successful
Two Waves against Pearl Harbor
Parshall is arguing with himself here. First he alleges that Fuchida “pressed
vigorously for a follow-up attack,” saying that the scene of an argument on
the bridge was mirrored in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! (a Hollywood film
really should not be used as evidence of historical accuracy), and then shows
how it never happened. This section would be better named “Parshall’s Tale
of the Missing Argument,” as neither Fuchida, Commander Minoru Genda,
nor anyone else testified that Fuchida had “pressed vigorously” or argued
for a follow-up attack. However, for this Parshall relies primarily on Haruo
Tohmatsu, who repeatedly states that Fuchida “demanded” a third wave.
Twentieth Century Fox publicity photo
Interestingly, Tohmatsu referred to the incident in his book A Gathering Darkness
by citing another of his books, Pearl Harbor, which does not contain notes—a
strange method for a serious nonfiction writer.8 Therefore, Parshall depends on
a secondary, undocumented source for his historical data.
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Two points—one, there was no argument, and two, no proposal was put forth.
I agree that no argument took place, but Fuchida never said it did. Regarding the
second point, the best that Genda could possibly have said was that he did not
hear the proposal, which would easily have been missed by Genda if he simply
was not there at the time.
Neither Fuchida nor Genda argued for the proposal, and, ironically, Genda
affirmed that in Parshall’s own article, so again, we find Parshall mistaken. In his
book Midway, Fuchida said that he “strongly recommended” to Nagumo a further attack on Oahu.9 He did, along with many others, want a further strike; as
did Lieutenant Jinichi Goto, commander of the Japanese torpedo bombers, who
said, “Most of the young flying officers were eager to attack Pearl Harbor again
because they wished to inflict as much damage as possible.”10 Parshall seems to
want it both ways: on one hand, he admits that Fuchida adamantly wanted another strike, while on the other he proposes that Fuchida never mentioned a word
of this to any of his leaders.
Prior to this, Fuchida had been debriefed by Nagumo and Kusaka in Genda’s
presence on the bridge, where they carefully assessed the total situation.11 Having
imagined losing up to half their ships and half their aircraft, all were contemplating some way to exploit the overwhelmingly favorable circumstances, but
in the end Nagumo went with Kusaka’s advice to cash in their chips and head
home. There is no indication throughout this section of any heated argument,
fist pounding, or histrionics. Anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Japanese
culture and protocol within the Imperial Japanese Navy would immediately
know that it would never occur to a subordinate officer to demand anything of
a superior officer.
A careful reading of Tohmatsu and Willmott’s Pearl Harbor shows that they
were primarily upset about Nagumo and Kusaka’s being ostracized or scapegoated, made to look like cowards, for turning back after the Pearl Harbor attack
and missing what appeared to be an opportune time to finish off the Americans.12
They make a good case—and I tend to agree with them—that Nagumo made the
best choice possible. Still, neither he nor Kusaka ever lived it down. The fictional
scene from Tora! Tora! Tora! certainly does not help.
A Mere Air Group Commander like Fuchida Would Never Be Privy to Such
Information
This is Parshall’s last attempt to try to “bury” Fuchida. He states regarding a
plan to invade Oahu: “Finally, of course, even if there had been such plans on
the grand strategic level, a mere air group commander like Fuchida almost certainly would not have been privy to their details on 7 December. Yet Fuchida’s
‘privileged’ statements to this retired American captain played nicely to the whole
American psychology relating to this battle.”
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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Gordon Prange wrote the following in At Dawn We Slept, regarding the
highest-ranking Japanese officers in this attack and their conversations on the
way to Pearl Harbor:
Immediately after lunch Nagumo held another meeting in Akagi’s ward-room. His
own staff attended, as did Yamaguchi and Hara, with their staffs, and all the flying
officers, headed by Fuchida. Nagumo opened this meeting by reading the instructions
which Genda and Fuchida had prepared for him en route to Hitokappu Bay. When
the young flying officers discovered that they would attack Pearl Harbor, “their joy
was beyond description.”
Then the airmen took over. Genda spoke for almost an hour. For the benefit of those
who had not attended the first session, he repeated what he had said that morning.
Then he analyzed the five major attack plans which he and Fuchida had prepared.
They had worked out the plans with their flight commanders in Kyushu during
September and October, so they were not pulling any major surprise. But they took
full advantage of this last chance to rehearse, to coordinate group thinking, and to
improve upon the design.13

Fuchida would have definitely known about a follow-up invasion, because he
and Genda would have been instructed what not to strike. First, Fuchida had been
personally appointed by Rear Admiral Nagumo as the senior flight commander,
First Air Fleet, First Carrier Division. He had trained and commanded the Kidô
Butai’s combined air forces for the six aircraft carriers, roughly four hundred
aircraft and eight hundred fliers—hardly a “mere” commander. Second, Fuchida
and Genda were best friends from the Eta Jima Naval Academy and continued
so throughout the war. They worked closely together in the months leading up
to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Fuchida easily knew more details about this attack
than did Nagumo and Yamamoto combined, and he proved it in his many interviews. Had there been any serious plans to invade Oahu, Fuchida would certainly
have been among the first to know. Parshall’s speculation has no foundation here.
PARSHALL’S SECOND ARGUMENT: A FIVE-MINUTE DISPARITY IN
THE FOG OF WAR
Parshall’s second indictment against Fuchida concerns his claim that at Midway
the Japanese were five minutes away from launching a counterattack. He states
that “Fuchida’s entire rendition of the climax of the most important naval battle
in American history was a lie. The Japanese were nowhere near ready to counterattack at this time.”
Let us begin with a fact I expect everyone will agree on, especially the bestinformed experts—that there is a tremendous amount of conflicting information, records, and testimonies on all sides about the events leading up to and
including the turning point of the battle of Midway. Every book on Midway that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/9
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U.S. Navy Photoprint no. W-MI-7-11957

I have studied (including Parshall’s book) says the same thing—it was an incredibly chaotic day, when looking at your watch or making log entries was the last
order of business for men on both sides. Nagumo’s communications log in his
battle report was compiled from the records of escort vessels, not from the actual
Akagi log, which, understandably, was lost when the carrier went down.14
Here is a taste from Dallas Isom’s Midway Inquest: “Senshi Sōsho fudges this . . . ,”
and “the entries in Nagumo’s battle report showing that the rearming operation was ordered at 0715 and countermanded at 0745 were fabrications to put
Nagumo in a better light.”15 Isom notes that the Senshi Sōsho is fragmentary, often
inconsistent, and inaccurate. Shortly after its release, the Senshi Sōsho came under
fire for being an “overall explanation” of events with missing or vague details, for
being too military friendly, for being written by staff members who had not been
involved in the operations, and for many other shortcomings.16 That is just the
Japanese side. Parshall’s book is loaded with American reports of contradictions
of every kind, from records to accounts of pilots (page 231 of his book is full of
them), but he rejects accounts that do not agree with his conclusions and accepts
those that do. Also, keep in mind that the Japanese lost four carriers in the battle
and many logbooks. Much of their information had to be re-created after the
events.
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Parshall says, “During the course of the morning’s operations the Japanese
carriers came under attack no fewer than five times by nine separate groups of
American aircraft. Not surprisingly, Japanese flight decks were quite busy with
combat air patrol (CAP) requirements. These activities, as well as the interspersed
American attacks, made it nearly impossible for the reserve strike force to be
readied on the Japanese flight decks.”
Did he say “nearly impossible”? So, then, it was possible. He goes on to say that
according to air group records, planes were landing on Akagi just fifteen minutes
before the attack, which would require that the after deck be totally clear. Were
these records accurate? No one knows. Parshall then states, “The official Japanese
war history on the battle, Senshi Sōsho, explicitly states that at the time of the
American attack there were no attack aircraft on the Japanese flight decks, only
combat air patrol fighters.” Isom clearly states that the Senshi Sōsho “fudged”
entries, and even Japanese historians admit that these compiled records are not
reliable. Primary sources are best—that is, eyewitnesses (preferably ones who
were not shooting or being shot at), not postbattle writers who were not there, as
is often the case in the Senshi Sōsho.
Parshall also says in his book that the idea that there were only a few fighters
on the deck of Akagi “stands in apparent conflict with certain eyewitness accounts made by American pilots, which often painted lurid portraits of bombs
exploding among packed enemy squadrons, and Japanese planes being catapulted around the flight decks or enveloped in sheets of flame.”17 These “eyewitness
accounts” match exactly with Fuchida’s statements.
Yet there is another eyewitness source I have never seen referenced, that of
Minoru Genda. Parshall quotes Genda in his article and obviously considers him
a credible source. So do I. His testimony in 1948 was that Akagi was fifteen minutes away from launching its attack.18 Was he telling “whoppers” too? Fuchida’s
book had yet to be published, so he had no idea what Fuchida was going to write,
and certainly Genda had no idea that someone was going to compare his obscure
answers to Fuchida’s book seventy years later.
So let me make clear what is being compared. On one side we have the calculations of a historian who has never seen a Japanese carrier, let alone been on
one—calculations seventy years after the fact based on records that are frequently
contradictory, often made by unknown third parties, incomplete, and sometimes
clearly altered. On the other hand, we have two eyewitnesses, career officers who
lived on Japanese carriers for years, knew Akagi from stem to stern, trained and
instructed its crews, witnessed the daily routines of mechanics attaching and
detaching torpedoes, had personally taken off and landed aircraft on carriers
hundreds of times, and thoroughly understood the operations for preparing an
attack on a firsthand basis—and who were actually there!
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/9
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Parshall says it was “nearly impossible” for them to have been prepared for a
counterattack. Fuchida’s estimate of five minutes and Genda’s of fifteen are the
most reliable sources of information on the timing of their counterattack. Historians like Parshall have made estimates based on information as to how long
it might normally take engineers to switch from land bombs to torpedoes, raise
aircraft to the flight deck, etc., and factoring in how attacks by Americans might
have slowed down the operation. This is fine and makes good sense, but at the
end of the day it has nothing to do with what took place. Fuchida and Genda were
actually there and knew what took place, like dozens of other witnesses. Fuchida
and Genda’s testimonies are consistent, and when Fuchida’s record was published
no one in Japan approached him or his publishers to contest the record. Now,
seventy years later, Parshall calls him a liar, on the basis of unreliable and clearly
contradictory information. Parshall has no case.
PARSHALL’S THIRD ARGUMENT: FUCHIDA WAS NEVER ON USS
MISSOURI DURING THE SURRENDER CEREMONIES
In God’s Samurai, Fuchida recounts the events leading up to and including the surrender ceremonies on
the deck of USS Missouri on 2 September 1945, how
he was called on to help ferry Japanese personnel
that day and remained on board during the ceremonies. Parshall considers this an “egregious” claim and
does his best to discredit Fuchida with disparaging
remarks and insults, but with no backup evidence
whatsoever.
Here are the exact references. The first is from
NHHC Photo no. SC 213700
God’s Samurai:
These preliminaries led up to the climax on the morning of 2 September, the formal
surrender aboard the Missouri. Fuchida prepared transportation for the Japanese
delegation, but the launches he secured proved unnecessary. An American destroyer
carried the official party to the battleship. Several liaison officers, army and navy,
went out in a “big, beautiful launch” assigned to the Yokosuka commander. Fuchida
was among them. These men ranked too far down the echelon to rate a position on
the surrender deck, but he could see the ceremony clearly from an upper deck.19

A second reference comes from the translated For That One Day: “In my role
as Staff of General Navy Headquarters, I was assigned miscellaneous tasks to help
the Japanese side’s preparations. Since I was not an official attaché, I was watching the signing ceremony from the upper deck along with the crews of the USS
Missouri.”20
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Fuchida on Board Missouri
When I first heard Parshall’s charges, they seemed a little far-fetched. Fuchida
had nothing to gain by mysteriously placing himself there, and he did not make
himself look good while he was there. The more I examined the facts, the more
the idea of Fuchida on board Missouri had the ring of authenticity.
Here is a breakdown of Parshall’s last set of questions and charges.

Why Would Fuchida Have Been on Board Missouri? What Possible Business
Did He Have There? There were many liaisons and delegates from many nations
on board that day besides Fuchida. It would be foolish to think that all the Japanese dignitaries made their own arrangements for transportation. Fuchida’s
simple statements are completely reasonable. If anything, they were a bit humiliating for him, as he was relegated to the role of taxi driver.
Parshall assumes that Fuchida said he was there to make himself look more
important than he was, when in fact Fuchida’s account of the story does quite
the opposite. He had despised MacArthur and considered him arrogant, but after
watching the ceremony he changed his opinion and admitted that MacArthur
was actually quite gracious to the Japanese, far more gracious than the Japanese
would have been to the Americans. This does not elevate Fuchida; it humbles
him.
Why Would an American Sailor Give Up His Place at This Historic Event to an
Unknown Japanese Officer? The war was over in every sense; in addition to an
end of physical hostilities, there was also an end to social hostilities. In Genda’s
Blade: Japan’s Squadron of Aces; 343 Kokutai, Henry Sakaida and Koji Takaki
show how after the war American pilots wanted a closer look at the modified
Shiden-Kai, while the Japanese wanted to see how American high-octane fuel
would give them the boost they had always dreamed of. After a Japanese pilot put
his fighter through its paces, dozens of American airmen surrounded the plane
and pilot taking photos and seeking autographs.21 Parshall knows full well when
the emperor gave his surrender speech, by and large the Japanese became shockingly submissive and compliant to the American occupation, despite the extreme
bitterness of that pill. They had submitted to their emperor in war, and they did
likewise in peace. It therefore is not surprising that this camaraderie existed on
board USS Missouri.
Why Would Fuchida Be Allowed to Wander into the Command Spaces of the
Flagship of the U.S. Fleet? There was certainly concern among top Navy brass
that extreme nationalists might try to sabotage the ceremony, especially with
a kamikaze plane, and they took many precautions. All air bases in the greater
Tokyo and Yokohama area were evacuated, the planes disarmed and disabled.
The man entrusted with this high-security detail was Mitsuo Fuchida, Group
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/9
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Commander, Aviation Staff of the General Navy Headquarters, Aviation Staff of
the Southern Naval Headquarters.
Fuchida also helped head off a coup, personally brought in Japanese officers
holding out against surrender, and authored a widely distributed pamphlet, entitled We Believe This!, to encourage those in the Japanese military to submit to
the emperor in peace, as they had in war, and fully comply and cooperate with all
the terms of surrender to the United States and allied powers.
If any Japanese officer was to be trusted for security reasons on Missouri that
day, it would have been Mitsuo Fuchida. There is no indication that he wandered
all over the ship, as Parshall implies. He certainly knew better. As for the unknown
photographers who were a part of the press corps, yes, they were closely watched,
as the record shows.
Why Were There No Photographs of Him, When We Have Photos of the Surrender Delegation? This sounds like a reasonable question at first, but on consideration, it is a weak argument. Fuchida was not a part of the surrender delegation,
nor did he ever claim to be. Also, this was the most humiliating day in the history
of the Japanese people. No self-respecting Japanese officer would be leaning into
any photos that day. This is something Fuchida would more likely avoid.
Photographers took pictures of all the key people, and as Parshall correctly
points out, Fuchida simply was not one of them. Even the commanding officer
of USS Missouri, Stuart S. Murray, stated that apart from a few formal shots in
which he was in the background, “I’m not generally visible anywhere.”22 If that
is how the commander of USS Missouri was photographed that day, why would
Fuchida be treated differently?
On the affirmative side, there are some pretty clear photos of those on the
decks of the ship that day, like the one reproduced here, which can be found on
the World War II database.23
Here also is a high-resolution photograph that allows the reader to zoom into
the third level, to the upper left of the Japanese flags, where there is an Asian man
without a hat with a short mustache.
Inset is a photo of Fuchida taken during the war.24 It looks very similar to the
man in the close-up of the larger image.
Although I am not an expert on the U.S. Navy of World War II, I do not believe
that “Hitler-style” mustaches were popular then, but we know that Fuchida kept
his mustache after the war—he was photographed giving testimony at the war
crimes trials.25 So, just as Fuchida described, here on board USS Missouri, right
before the surrender ceremonies, on an upper deck, we find a round-headed,
Asian-looking man with a Hitler-style mustache among the American sailors. Is
this Fuchida? It certainly could be.
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National Archives Interagency Working Group File
no. AC856786

NHHC Photo no. SC 210644

Michael Weidenbach Verified Fuchida’s Absence from Missouri
Parshall correctly credits me with obtaining information from Michael Weidenbach, curator and archivist of the collections department for the Battleship
Missouri Memorial, Pearl Harbor. Parshall states it this way when he quotes
Weidenbach:
If Fuchida had been aboard the Missouri in any capacity whatsoever, “his presence
would have been noted, and his placement would have been noted in the official
records . . . and would have been strictly monitored and recorded.”
[This] is yet another reminder (if any were needed) that proving a negative is
oftentimes a lot harder than proving a positive. However, it is the historian’s job to
produce positive evidence to support the claims that are made by the participants in
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our narratives. In this case, the onus was on Fuchida to support his rather incredible
claims. His story, while superficially plausible, failed when subjected to the weight of
the other positive evidence we have on this highly documented ceremony.

Weidenbach “verified Fuchida’s absence”? That is actually quite difficult to do.
Yes, he verified that Fuchida was not a part of the official boarding party, but then
Fuchida never said he was, and he also stated that there is no record of him being
on board that day—so case closed, right? No. I contacted Michael Weidenbach
again and asked for a full roster of personnel on board USS Missouri that day,
and this is what he said:
There is no single roster of all the individuals that were aboard that day. There are
records scattered around in various records depositories that we are still seeking out
and gradually gathering. There are rosters of the dignitaries and key officers that
were invited to participate or witness the ceremony, but there appears to be no record
made of their accompanying staff members or others who may also have arrived
aboard.
We’ve tracked down a listing of war correspondents, but it may or may not be
complete or entirely accurate. We have a copy of the Missouri crew roster from the
National Archives, but it is dated July, 1945; so it is very likely not accurate for September. In short, we have records and we are continuing to search and gather, but we
don’t yet have a complete or clear record of all those who were aboard that day.26

No single roster? No official records of accompanying staff? No complete or
clear records? Then there certainly is no way to verify that Fuchida was not on
board. In this entire section, Parshall provides nothing to show that Fuchida was
not on board USS Missouri that day.
Some Final Notes on the Missouri Surrender Ceremony
Over time, as I have thought about this event, more and more things have always
pointed in the same direction, bearing out the idea that Fuchida’s consistent testimony was true from the beginning. Here is more information that supports him.
I noticed this section in God’s Samurai regarding the signing ceremony:
“Umezu, who had fought surrender to the last ditch, signed for both the Japanese
armed forces. As he did so one of the Chinese delegates hissed loudly and triumphantly. ‘The U.S. delegates didn’t like this impolite gesture, from the expression
on their faces,’ Fuchida recalled.”27
No one would have cared about such a minor footnote of the ceremony or
noted it—no one, that is, but a Japanese national. Fuchida did. Gordon Prange
and Donald Goldstein, experts on the Pacific War and military protocol, had no
issue with Fuchida’s description of his being at the ceremonies. Prange was a
naval officer who had worked with MacArthur and would have understood U.S.
Navy protocol at the time extremely well.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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The following information only reached me recently, from the journals of
Glen Wagner: On 7 December 1949, General Douglas MacArthur met with Glenn
Wagner, foreign secretary for the Pocket Testament League, who asked about the
general’s thoughts on bringing one million copies of the New Testament into Japan. MacArthur said, “Make it 10 million.” Fuchida was one of the many Japanese
who received a copy of the over eleven million scriptures eventually distributed
by the Pocket Testament League. On 14 April 1950, Fuchida met with Glenn
Wagner and several others and recounted many of his experiences during the
war. That evening, Wagner noted in his personal journal that Fuchida said, “First
to step on Battleship Missouri—Lit cigarette and was grabbed by a US Marine.”28
This was among a long list of other details Fuchida communicated, none of
which are disputed.
Parshall also states that “there were literally thousands of potential American
witnesses to this particular story, who might have come forward to debunk it.”
Maybe no one did because no one could.
If one connects all the dots, they point to one thing—that Fuchida was indeed
on USS Missouri, just as he has always maintained, and there is no evidence of
any kind to contradict it.
Why Would Fuchida Make This Up? What Would Be His Motive?
Perhaps this is where the roots of Parshall’s judgment of Fuchida come to light.
After making a host of sweeping judgments based on speculation and conjecture,
he paints Fuchida as a cocky, religious phony. Here is how Parshall begins his final
section:
A glimpse into the inner character of the man is revealed in the movie Tora! Tora!
Tora! for which both Prange and Fuchida were technical advisers. During one scene,
near the beginning of the movie, Fuchida lands his plane on the carrier Akagi. Dismounting, he is immediately surrounded by other aviators. Fuchida tells them they’d
better treat him well, because he is their new air group commander. Surprised by this
news, one of the pilots asks how he rated another promotion. Fuchida responds, to
the general hilarity of all assembled, “Well, exceptional people get exceptional treatment!” I believe this illustrates something central about the man.

Is Parshall going back to Hollywood again? In fact, Fuchida was not a consultant for the film; Genda and Prange were, but even as consultants they did not
have any control over the script. This scene is totally fictional. Fuchida never said
such a thing. Was Fuchida a cocky pilot? I think the record shows that he was.
Most attack pilots on the front line of battle are. They have to have an element of
confidence far above that of the rank and file to take the risks they do and make
it back alive. However, that is not the person Fuchida was after the war.
Parshall goes on to state—erroneously—that Fuchida was ordained and
that he loved the accolades and attention it brought him. Where are the facts to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/9
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support any of this? He was never ordained, so Parshall’s ideas surrounding that
notion are false. I traveled to meet a man who after the war had worked beside
Fuchida for many months, and he described Fuchida as a humble, gentle man
who never bragged about his part in the war but rather profusely apologized at
every opportunity—the exact opposite of Parshall’s picture.29 Over my years of
research on Fuchida I have come into contact with many who knew him, worked
with him, or met with him, and all say the same thing. I have never known or
heard of anyone who painted the kind of picture of Fuchida that Parshall does.
Parshall has told me directly that he never actually read Fuchida’s full story,
either in his biography or his published memoirs, and that he has had no interest
in them. Had he done so, he may have had a clearer and more accurate picture of
who Fuchida really was. Half of Fuchida’s story found in God’s Samurai is about
his postwar years and who he became—a man once filled with hatred toward
Americans, with an inflated pride in his country and in himself, who in the end
was humble and loved his former enemies. Some people can and do change.
Fuchida did.
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